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Safeguards against Excessive Enforcement Measures in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone – Law and Practice 
 
James Harrison* 
 
Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of enforcement powers of coastal states within the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the situations in which those powers may be exercised 
against ships navigating in this zone.  It reflects upon the nature of the powers conferred upon 
coastal states, as well as the safeguards that are imposed upon the exercise of those powers.  
In particular, the paper will consider how the law of the sea strikes a balance between the 
interest of coastal states in ensuring that rules and regulations in the EEZ are enforced and the 
interest of flag states in ensuring that there is no encroachment upon legitimate freedom of 
navigation. The paper will consider the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as how these provisions have been interpreted and 
applied in practice in the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.   
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the major outcomes of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS III) was the extension of coastal state jurisdiction. Delegates agreed to 
the creation of a number of new maritime zones, one of the most significant of which 
was the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  According to this new doctrine, the coastal 
states were granted sovereign rights and exclusive jurisdiction over a range of issues 
in waters up to 200 nautical miles from their coast.  Within the EEZ, coastal state has 
sovereign rights overs living and non-living resources, as well as ‘other activities for 
the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone.’1 Coastal states also have 
sovereign jurisdiction over the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations 
and structures, marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment.2 At the same time, the interests of other states were protected 
and they continued to enjoy, ‘subject to the relevant provisions of [the] Convention’, 
certain fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of navigation.3  Thus, in 
interpreting and applying the Convention, it is necessary to bear in mind the balance 
between the interests of coastal states and flag states. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Lecturer in International Law, University of Edinburgh School of Law. Contact email: 
james.harrison@ed.ac.uk.  
 
1 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter, Law of the Sea Convention), Art. 
56(1)(a). 
2 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 56(1)(b). 
3 Ibid, Art. 58(1). 
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This paper will address the extent of enforcement powers conferred upon 
coastal states within the EEZ and the situations in which those powers may be 
exercised against ships navigating in this zone.  The arrest and detention of foreign 
vessels was considered to be ‘a particularly sensitive matter’4 during the negotiation 
of the Convention. Maritime states, defending their interest in navigational freedom, 
were not willing to confer comprehensive powers of enforcement on coastal states in 
this new zone. Thus, an important part of the compromise negotiated at UNCLOS III 
was the imposition of certain safeguards associated with the exercise of these new 
competences. It is the nature and scope of these safeguards that will be the focus of 
this paper.   
There is no single set of safeguards that apply to all of the enforcement powers 
conferred on the coastal state. Rather, the safeguard provisions are to be found 
scattered throughout the Convention. The paper will explore the range of safeguards 
that are applied to enforcement powers in the EEZ, but also discuss the nature of these 
safeguards and what they tell us about the balance between coastal state jurisdiction 
and freedom of navigation. Many of these safeguards employ terms such as 
‘necessary’, ‘reasonable’ or appropriate’ in order to delineate this balance.  As noted 
by Franckx, the use of such drafting techniques postpones the decision as to the 
precise balance between coastal state and flag state interests.5  Essentially, the drafters 
chose to delegate the task of striking the balance to courts and tribunals in interpreting 
and applying the Convention.  Thus, the analysis provides an opportunity to reflect 
upon the jurisprudence that has emerged since the entry into force of the Convention 
and to assess whether it provides satisfactory guidance on this important topic.  
 
2. Powers of Arrest in the EEZ and Applicable Safeguards 
The Convention does not have a single provision on the ability of a coastal state to 
arrest vessels suspected of violating its laws and regulations in the EEZ. Rather, the 
issue is addressed in relation to each individual competence.  In some cases, the 
Convention is explicit in detailing the enforcement powers of the coastal state. In 
other cases, no enforcement powers are expressly conferred on the coastal state and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 B.H. Oxman, ‘Observations on Vessel Release under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea’ (1996) 11 I.J.M.C.L. 201-215, 202. 
5 E. Franckx, ‘”Reasonable Bond” in the Practice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’ 
(2001-2002) 32 C.W.Int’lL.J. 303-342, 309. 
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therefore one must first enquire whether such powers exist, before asking what limits 
may apply thereto. 
 
2.1 Powers of Arrest and Specific Safeguards in relation to Fisheries Offences 
One of the driving forces behind the establishment of the EEZ was the demand by 
many coastal states for stronger rights to the living resources in their adjacent waters.  
The issue had been raised at previous law of the sea conferences, yet it had not been 
possible to reach a settlement.6  Nevertheless, the issue continued to cause problems.7  
Finally, a compromise was reached whereby coastal states were granted sovereign 
rights for the purposes of conserving and managing fish stocks within 200 nautical 
miles of the territory.8 Foreign fishing vessels were only permitted access to those 
living resources with the agreement of the coastal state. 
The power of a coastal state to exercise enforcement powers over foreign 
fishing vessels is explicitly addressed in Article 73 of the Convention.9 Coastal states 
can exercise enforcement powers both against vessels which are not authorized to fish 
in its EEZ, as well as to ensure compliance with laws and regulations by those vessels 
which are authorized to fish therein. Amongst the enforcement measures explicitly 
listed in Article 73(1) are ‘boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings.’ 
Thus, there is no doubt that the officials of the coastal state may stop and search a 
suspect vessel and, if there is evidence of a violation, they may bring the vessel to 
port and start criminal proceedings in national courts.  
However, this power is also subject to certain safeguards, designed to ensure 
that the coastal state does not encroach upon the legitimate rights and interests of 
other states when exercising these powers.  First and foremost, Article 73(1) requires 
that enforcement measures taken by the coastal state must be ‘necessary.’ This 
necessity standard is central to determining the balance between coastal state rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The issue had been dealt with in Articles 6-7 of the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation on 
the High Seas, but many states remained unsatisfied with this solution and the treaty received very little 
support.  Coastal state rights over fish stocks was thus one of the questions that was submitted to the 
Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, but this conference was also unable to come to a 
satisfactory compromise. Conference Resolution II simply noted that ‘the development of international 
law affecting fishing may lead to changes in practices and requirements of many states.’ 
7 Notably, a major dispute over the rights of a coastal state to regulate fisheries in its coastal waters was 
brought to the International Court of Justice a few years before the commencement of negotiations at 
UNCLOS III: see Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (1974) ICJ Reports 3 and 175. 
8 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 56(1)(b).  
9 See also ibid, Art. 62(4)(k), which lists ‘enforcement procedures’ amongst the matters that may be 
regulated by the coastal state in relation to nationals of other states fishing in the EEZ. 
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and the interests of other states.  The inclusion of this phrase means that the 
enforcement actions of the coastal state are subject to some scrutiny by an 
international court or tribunal. As explained by Judge Paik in his separate opinion in 
the M/V Virginia G Case, ‘the notion of necessity attempts to balance two conflicting 
interests at play: namely, preserving the freedom of a state to achieve the objective it 
seeks through means of its choosing, and restraining the state from choosing means 
that would unduly infringe the protected rights or interests of another entity, be it an 
individual or a state. The notion of necessity understood this way can be characterized 
essentially as a “balancing test.”’10   The question is what standard of review will be 
adopted by a court or tribunal when interpreting this provision and determining 
whether an appropriate balance has been struck.  
At the outset, it must be remarked that the term ‘necessary’ is open-ended. As 
noted by the WTO Appellate Body, the term can have a range of meanings from 
‘indispensible’ to ‘making a contribution to.’11  This leaves a lot of discretion to a 
court or tribunal as to how much leeway it gives to the coastal state in its enforcement 
decisions.  
In the M/V Virginia G Case, the Tribunal simply noted that ‘neither the 
boarding and inspection nor the arrest of the M/V Virginia G violated article 73, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention’12, without any explanation of its finding. Thus they 
did not clarify how this standard should be interpreted in the context of enforcement 
measures.13   
It is suggested that the fact that the coastal state is exercising sovereign rights 
should have an important bearing on how this standard is interpreted. The notion of 
sovereign rights suggests that the coastal state should have a broad margin of 
appreciation in exercising its enforcement powers.  This view has been expressed in a 
slightly different context by Vice President Hoffman and Judges Rao, Marotta 
Rangel, Kateka, Gao, and Bouguetaia, who argued that ‘[t]he term “sovereign rights” 
ought to carry with it a degree of deference to the coastal state in its exercise of those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 M/V Virginia G Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Paik, para. 9.  See also para. 24: ‘In the balancing 
test, the relative importance of those interests to the respective state or states is an important factor to 
be considered in assessing whether a measure in question is necessary.’ 
11 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, WTO Appellate Body Report, 11 December 2000, para. 161.  
12 M/V Virginia G Case, ITLOS Judgment of 14 April 2014, para. 265. 
13 The Tribunal did interpret and apply the test in Article 73(1) in the context of sanctions applied by 
the coastal state, as discussed below. 
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rights, unless such deference is denied by the Convention itself.’14  It does not follow 
that the coastal state has complete deference in this regard. The necessity test is after 
all a justiciable standard that can be applied by courts and tribunals. Yet, coastal states 
should not be found in violation of Article 73(1) unless their action can be shown to 
be arbitrary or patently unreasonable.  
It must also be borne in mind that whether or not an enforcement measure is 
necessary will depend upon the facts of the particular case. In relation to the 
inspection and arrest of vessels engaged in fishing the EEZ, the coastal state should 
arguably have greater discretion.  According to one author, the coastal state  may 
inspect fishing vessels ‘as a matter of right.’15  Indeed, the exercise of this power 
would appear to be necessary for the coastal state to ensure that its national laws and 
regulations are being followed by fishing vessels.  However, the more intrusive the 
powers exercised by the coastal state, the more justification they may require. 
Therefore, the decision to arrest a vessel may not always be necessary unless there is 
some evidence of an offence.  In other words, Article 73(1) would appear to contain 
an implicit evidential threshold for the exercise of enforcement powers, requiring 
there to be reasonable grounds for believing that an offence has taken place.16 
Similarly, if a foreign fishing vessel is merely navigating through the EEZ, it 
is arguable that a coastal state should have to show some evidence that an offence has 
been committed before exercising any enforcement powers over that vessel. This 
would be the case even in the case of an inspection of the vessel, as inspection itself 
amounts to an interference with the freedom of navigation being exercised by the 
vessel. Again, it is appropriate to impose a minimum evidential threshold on the 
coastal state to prevent it from abusing its enforcement powers. 
Yet, in both situations, the evidential threshold should not be set too high. 
Doing so, would undermine the sovereign rights of the coastal state. We will return to 
this issue when discussing the necessity of penalties below.  
 
2.2 Powers of Arrest and Specific Safeguards in relation to Environmental 
Offences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 M/V Virginia G Case, Dissenting Opinion of Vice President Hoffman and Judges Rao, Marotta 
Rangel, Kateka, Gao, and Bouguetaia, para. 49. 
15 D. Anderson, ‘Investigation, Detention and Release of Foreign Vessels under the UN Convention on 
the law of the Sea of 1982 and Other International Agreements’ (1996) 11 I.J.M.C.L. 165-177, 171.  
16 Compare the explicit evidential threshold in relation to pollution offences, below. 
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Article 56 of the Convention confers on the coastal state ‘jurisdiction as provided for 
in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to … the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment.’17 The precise powers of the coastal state in 
this regard are elaborated in Part XII of the Convention, which permits the coastal 
state to regulate dumping18 and pollution by ships.19  
The coastal state has a broad power to regulate dumping within the EEZ and 
the Convention makes clear that ‘dumping … shall not be carried out without the 
express prior approval of the coastal state.’20 Indeed, the coastal state is required to 
ensure that its national laws are at least as effective as global rules and standards on 
dumping, emphasizing that this is a matter that should be strictly controlled.21  To this 
end, Article 216 explicitly confers a power on the coastal state to enforce laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine 
environment by dumping in its EEZ.22 This provision does not explicitly define the 
enforcement powers to be exercised by the coastal state, although it is reasonable to 
assume that it includes the inspection, arrest and initiation of proceedings against a 
vessel suspected of having violated relevant laws and regulations. However, some 
safeguards do apply to the exercise of these enforcement powers. Firstly, the 
Convention explicitly provides that enforcement activities must be carried out by a 
vessel that is identifiable as being on government service.23  Secondly, any inspection 
must not delay the vessel any longer than is necessary.24  Thus, a necessity analysis is 
applied to the investigation of vessels in a similar way to fishing offences. The 
provision would equally apply to a situation where an inspection is carried out in a 
manner that unduly delays the ships, as well as the situation where there was no 
evidence for an inspection in the first place.  As in the case of fisheries enforcement, 
it is suggested that the necessity of inspection and arrest will depend upon there being 
some evidence of an offence, albeit a low threshold.  Unlike fisheries enforcement, in 
the case of environmental offences, states are also required to provide a national 
remedy for any damage or loss that may be attributable to measures which exceed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 56(1)(b)(iii). 
18 Ibid, Art. 210(5). 
19 Ibid, Art. 211(5)-(6). 
20 Ibid, Art. 210(5). 
21 Ibid, Art. 210(6). 
22 Ibid, Art. 216(1)(b). 
23 Ibid, Art. 224. 
24 Ibid, Art. 226(1)(a).  
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those which are reasonably required.25  Finally, if the coastal state does find evidence 
that dumping has taken place and it initiates judicial proceedings against the vessel, it 
is obliged to suspend such proceedings if proceedings are also initiated within six 
months by the flag state of the vessel.26 This reflects the fact that jurisdiction over the 
marine environment is shared between the coastal state and the flag state. In practice, 
this provision confers a right of preemption on the flag state.  The only situation in 
which such a suspension is not required is if the offence relates to a case of major 
damage to the coastal state or if the flag state has a record of failing to effectively 
enforce pollution laws against its vessels.27  
Less discretion is given to coastal states in relation to other environmental 
offences by foreign vessels. The legislative jurisdiction of the coastal state over 
pollution from ships is limited by reference to ‘generally accepted international rules 
and standards.’28 This limitation ensures that coastal states cannot hamper freedom of 
navigation by the prescription of overly restrictive unilateral standards. Coastal states 
are also granted an explicit power of detention and instituting proceedings against the 
vessel.29  However, this power is subject to stringent conditions and the precise 
enforcement measures that may be taken by the coastal state will depend upon a 
number of factors.30 Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel has 
committed a pollution offence in the EEZ, the coastal state may ‘require the vessel to 
give information regarding its identity and port of registry, its last and next port of 
call and other relevant information required to establish whether a violation has 
occurred.’31 It is clear from this provision that it is intended to allow the coastal state 
to gather relevant information which may be passed on to another state (port state or 
flag state) to initiate proceedings in accordance with the Convention.  However, it 
falls far short of empowering the coastal state to take enforcement action itself.  It is 
only in the situation where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel has 
committed an offence ‘resulting in a substantial discharge causing or threatening 
significant pollution of the marine environment’ that a coastal state may even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid, Art. 232. 
26 Ibid, Art. 228(1). 
27 Ibid, Art. 228(1). 
28 Ibid, Art. 211(5). 
29 Ibid, Art. 220(6). 
30 Anderson (n 16) 174: ‘Paragraphs 3 to 7 lay down graduated responses to cases where there are clear 
grounds for believing that violations of international rules and standards for the prevention of pollution 
in the exclusive economic zone have been committed.’ 
31 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 220(3). 
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contemplate the inspection of a vessel at sea.32  Furthermore, such investigations must 
be carried out in a way that does not delay the vessel any longer than is necessary33 
and, as in the case of dumping, it must allow claims in its national law for any damage 
or loss that may be attributable to measures which exceed those which are reasonably 
required.34  Detention of a vessel following inspection is only permissible if there is 
‘clear objective evidence’ of a violation that results in ‘a discharge causing major 
damage or threat of major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal 
state, or to any resources of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone.’35 Thus, in 
the case of pollution offences, the evidential threshold is explicit.  Clear objective 
evidence is obviously a high standard36 and there is also a very high threshold of 
damage that must have been caused before enforcement action may be taken, which 
leads to the conclusion that this power is clearly only intended to apply to the rarest of 
circumstances.37  Yet, the terms are also ambiguous and therefore there may still be a 
role for courts and tribunal deciding whether the action taken by coastal states is 
lawful or not.  
 
2.3 The Power of Arrest and Specific Safeguards in relation to Safety Zones 
around Artificial Islands, Installations and Structures in the EEZ 
The Convention confers on the coastal state ‘the exclusive right to construct and to 
authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of’ all artificial islands and 
other installations and structures to be used for an economic purpose within the 
EEZ.38  In addition, ‘the coastal state may, where necessary, establish reasonable 
safety zones around such artificial islands, installations and structures in which it may 
take appropriate measures to ensure the safety both of navigation and of the artificial 
islands, installations and structures.’39  It is possible that the coastal state could even 
prohibit freedom of navigation in a safety zone for the purposes of ensuring the safety 
of offshore operations.  However, the Convention is ambiguous as to what precise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid, Art. 220(5). 
33 Ibid, Art. 226(1). 
34 Ibid, Art. 232. 
35 Ibid, Art. 220(6). 
36 See A. Pozdnakova, Criminal Jurisdiction over Perpetrators in Ship-Source Pollution Cases 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 109. 
37 It is worth noting that the right of preemption of a flag state under Article 228(1) of the Convention 
would not apply in this situation as the existence of ‘major damage’ is a condition of the exercise of 
this jurisdiction. 
38 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 60(1). 
39 Ibid, Art. 60(2). 
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measures may be taken to enforce such laws and regulations.40  
It can be argued that the concept of ‘appropriate measures’ under Article 60(2) 
includes the power to arrest a vessel if it violates the regulations adopted by the 
coastal state in a safety zone.  As noted by Judge Golitsyn in the Arctic Sunrise Case, 
‘Laws and regulations enacted by the coastal state in furtherance of its exclusive 
jurisdiction under article 60, paragraph 2, of the Convention would be meaningless if 
the coastal state did not have the authority to ensure their enforcement. Consequently, 
it follows from article 60, paragraph 2, of the Convention that the coastal state has the 
right to enforce such laws and regulations, including by detaining and arresting 
persons violating laws and regulations governing activities on artificial islands, 
installations and structures.’41   
It is also clear from Article 60(2) that the coastal state does not have complete 
discretion in determining whether to exercise its enforcement powers.  There are a 
number of conditions which attach to the powers of the coastal state in this context. 
Firstly, the laws and regulations which are being enforced must be necessary and 
reasonable in the first place.  In this regard, the Convention explicitly requires that 
‘artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones around them may 
not be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea 
lanes essential to international navigation.’42 Thus, the impact on freedom of 
navigation should be limited at the outset by the design of the safety zones. The 
Convention also requires that enforcement measures must be ‘appropriate.’ As with 
the safeguards that are applicable to the other rights in the EEZ, the interpretation of 
this provision requires the striking of a balance between the rights of the coastal state 
and the interests of other states.43  Yet, the choice of the term ‘appropriate’ would 
seem to suggest a margin of appreciation for the coastal state at least as broad as the 
case of fisheries offences, if not broader. It follows that there will be very few 
situations in which the arrest and prosecution of vessels for the violation of a safety 
zone will not be appropriate.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See D. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Clarendon Press, 1987) 90; M. 
Nordquist et al (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 – A Commentary, vol. 2 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) 586. 
41 Arctic Sunrise, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Golitsyn, para. 23. 
42 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 60(7). 
43 See Attard (n 40) 91: ‘the framework proposed by Article 60 attempts to create a balance between 
the exclusive right to establish artificial islands etc., and the community’s navigational interests.’ 
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2.4 The Power of Arrest and Specific Safeguards in relation to Marine Scientific 
Research in the EEZ 
Article 56 of the Convention confers to the coastal state ‘jurisdiction as provided for 
in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to … marine scientific 
research.’44 Further detail on the extent of this jurisdiction can be found in Article 246 
of the Convention, which provides in its opening paragraph that ‘[c]oastal states, in 
the exercise of their jurisdiction, have the right to regulate, authorize and conduct 
marine scientific research in their exclusive economic zone and on their continental 
shelf in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention.’45 The relevant 
provisions clearly require the consent of the coastal state for any research project 
conducted in the EEZ, although the mechanisms for granting that consent vary 
depending on the precise circumstances.46   
This article makes no mention of any powers of enforcement against vessels 
engaged in marine scientific research.  Attard concludes from this omission that the 
only enforcement power available to a coastal state is the ability to suspend or 
terminate a project in accordance with Article 253; he says that ‘in ensuring that the 
researching state does not violate its rights, [the coastal state] may suspend or cease 
the project but cannot, for example, arrest the researching vessel.’47  It must be 
wondered, however, whether there are no situations in which the coastal state could 
arrest a research vessel if it was failing to comply with the conditions that had been 
attached to the research project by the coastal state. To the contrary, Article 298(1)(b) 
refers to ‘law enforcement activities’ in the context of marine scientific research and 
the ordinary meaning of this term arguably include the power to inspect and arrest a 
vessel that had violated the relevant legal framework. Moreover, as a matter of policy, 
it would seem that the coastal state should have the ability to arrest and bring 
proceedings against that vessel in order to protect its exclusive rights. At the same 
time, as with the other areas of EEZ competence, it may be necessary to impose some 
sort of evidential threshold on the coastal state in order to prevent the abuse of this 
enforcement power.  Without such a safeguard, the coastal state may be able to 
undermine the balance between its own rights and the freedom of navigation of other 
states. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 56(1)(b)(ii). 
45 Ibid, Art. 246(1). 
46 Ibid, Art. 246(2)-(6). 
47 Attard (n 40) 117. 
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2.5 General Safeguards on the Power of Arrest in the EEZ 
In addition to the specific safeguards on arrest discussed above, there are a number of 
other conditions that apply to the exercise of this power over vessels in the EEZ. 
Firstly, Article 225 of the Convention provides that ‘in the exercise under this 
Convention of their powers of enforcement against foreign vessels, states shall not 
endanger the safety of navigation or otherwise create any hazard to a vessel, or bring 
it to an unsafe port or anchorage, or expose the marine environment to an 
unreasonable risk.’ Although this provision is found in Part XII relating to the 
protection of the marine environment, it refers to the exercise of powers of 
enforcement ‘under this Convention’ and it therefore applies to all enforcement 
activities.48  This provision is quite broad and it could cover a range of limitations on 
the enforcement jurisdiction of a state, including the manner in which arrests are 
carried out.   
In practice, the regulation of arrests by coastal states has not been addressed 
through the prism of Article 225, but rather through general rules of international law.  
It is generally accepted that the powers of the coastal state include the possibility to 
use force where necessary.49 The regulation of the use of force is not expressly dealt 
with in the Convention.  However, in the M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case, the Tribunal held 
that ‘[a]lthough the Convention does not contain express provisions on the use of 
force in the arrest of ships, international law, which is applicable by virtue of Article 
293 of the Convention, requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as 
possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable 
and necessary in the circumstances.’50 On the facts of that particular case, the 
Tribunal found that the Guinean authorities had violated these rules, by firing live 
ammunition from a fast-moving patrol boat without warnings and by firing 
indiscriminately while on the deck of the vessel, including using gunfire to stop the 
engine of the ship.51  
The problem with the approach of the Tribunal in this case is that it is not 
entirely clear that it had jurisdiction to deal with a claim based on rules that are not 
contained in the Convention.  Article 293 of the Convention does permit the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This interpretation was confirmed by ITLOS in the M/V Virginia G Case (n 13) para. 373. 
49 Ibid, para. 360. See also Nordquist (n 40) 794. 
50 M/V Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS Judgment of 1 July 1999, para. 155. 
51 Ibid, paras 157-159. 
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application of other rules of international law that are compatible with the 
Convention, but there is a ‘cardinal distinction’ between applicable law and 
jurisdiction.52  Thus, whilst it is permissible to refer to other rules of international law 
in the reasoning of a decision, it would seem to be go beyond the jurisdiction of a 
court if other rules are the basis of the dispositif of the judgment, as was the case in 
M/V Saiga No. 2.53  It would have been preferable in that particular case to refer to 
Article 225, which would have arguably allowed the Tribunal to read a similar rule 
into the Convention as a matter of treaty interpretation, rather than relying upon the 
application of a rule that wasn’t found in the Convention at all. 
The M/V Saiga No. 2 is not a sole example of a willingness to look beyond the 
confines of the Convention for additional rules to curtail the enforcement powers of 
the coastal state. In another example, the Tribunal has made clear that, when 
exercising enforcement powers under Article 73, states must operate according to 
other general requirements under international law, including ‘that enforcement 
activities can be exercised only by duly authorized identifiable officials of a coastal 
state and that their vessels must be clearly marked as being on government service.’54  
As seen above, this requirement is found in relation to some specific EEZ offences.55 
Indeed, it has been applied to certain categories of fisheries enforcement actions under 
the Fish Stocks Agreement.56 Yet, there is no express provision that applies this 
principle to fisheries enforcement in the EEZ.57  There is clearly a lacuna in the 
Convention in this context. However, one is entitled to ask whether it is legitimate for 
the Tribunal, as a judicial organ to fill this gap. Even if one does not disagree with the 
substantive rule that is being applied in this case, the decision does raise questions 
about the circumstances in which the Tribunal is willing to go beyond the terms of the 
Convention. Frequent recourse to this tactic introduces a degree of uncertainty about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 MOX Plant Case, Procedural Order No. 3 of 24 June 2003, para. 19. As was also explained in 
Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention, Final Award of 2 
July 2003, para. 85, failure to draw this distinction would have the result of creating ‘an unqualified 
and comprehensive jurisdictional regime in which there would be no limit ratione materiae.’ 
53 See further J. Harrison, ‘Judicial Law-Making and the Developing Order of the Oceans’ (2007) 22 
I.J.M.C.L. 283-302, 301.   
54 M/V Virgnia G Case (n 13) para. 342. See also dispositif para. 12 in which it is clear that the 
Tribunal is extending a ‘principle’ found elsewhere in the Convention to the situation of fisheries 
enforcement in the EEZ. 
55 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 224 on protection of the marine environment. See also Law of the 
Sea Convention, Art. 111(5) on hot pursuit. 
56 Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 21(4) on subregional and regional cooperation in enforcement on the 
high seas. 
57 M/V Virgnia G Case (n 13). 
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the precise balance of rights and interests contained therein and it threatens the 
integrity of the Convention regime.58 
 
3. Notification in Cases of Arrest or Detention of Foreign Vessels 
Once an arrest has taken place in accordance with the applicable provisions of the 
Convention, a series of other obligations are potentially triggered. The first of these 
obligations is the duty to notify the flag state of the arrest. 
Where the coastal state has arrested or detained a foreign fishing vessel, 
Article 73(4) establishes a duty of the coastal state to ‘promptly notify the flag state, 
through appropriate channels, of action taken and of any penalties subsequently 
imposed.’ The provision leaves it to the discretion of the coastal state to choose an 
appropriate channel.59  
A similar provision is found in relation to the inspection, arrest and 
commencement of proceedings for pollution offences. Article 231 requires the coastal 
state to not only notify the flag state or the measures taken by it, but also to ‘submit to 
the flag state all official reports concerning such measures.’  
On the other hand, there are no similar provisions relating to arrests for other 
offences committed in the EEZ. It does not follow that equivalent obligations may not 
exist under other international instruments.  For example, Article 36(1)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations requires a state to inform, without delay, 
the consular authorities if a national of that state has been ‘arrested or committed to 
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.’60 This provision 
would arguably apply to the arrest or detention of crew members in the EEZ.  
However, a key difference of this provision is that it does not cover the arrest of the 
ship and therefore, if the crew were of a different nationality to the flag of the vessel, 
the flag state may not receive notification that the vessel had been arrested.  
Moreover, these provisions would not be enforceable through the dispute settlement 
provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention, thus undermining their effectiveness as 
a potential safeguard. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 See also A. Boyle and J. Harrison, ‘Judicial Settlement of Environmental Disputes: Current 
Problems’ (2013) 4 J.I.D.S. 245-276: ‘a carefully structured dispute settlement scheme, such as Part 
XV of UNCLOS, is unlikely to survive expansive rewriting of this kind.’ 
59 Any mention of consular or diplomatic channels were dropped from the text in the drafting process; 
Nordquist (n 40), 795. 
60 It was this provision which was the subject of dispute in the La Grand Case (2001) ICJ Reports 466. 
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4. Prompt Release  
Another significant safeguard on the exercise of coastal state enforcement powers in 
the EEZ is the requirement of prompt release.  Not only does the Convention contain 
several provisions on prompt release, but it also creates a specific dispute settlement 
procedure for this purpose. According to Article 292(1): 
 
‘Where the authorities of a state Party have detained a vessel flying the flag of 
another state Party and it is alleged that the detaining state has not complied 
with the provisions of this Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or 
its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security, the 
question of release from detention may be submitted to any court or tribunal 
agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within 10 days from the 
time of detention, to a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining state under 
article 287 or to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, unless the 
parties agree otherwise.’ 
 
In exercising this power, a court or tribunal plays an important role in 
upholding the balance of interests enshrined in the EEZ regime.  The following 
sections will consider how this balance has been struck in practice and what issues 
arise in the implementation of the prompt release provisions. 
 
4.1 Prompt Release in the Case of Fisheries Offences 
If the coastal state does exercise its powers of arrest in relation to fisheries vessels, 
Article 73(2) provides that it must offer to promptly release the vessels or crew, 
pending a trial, on payment of a bond or other financial security. Article 73 (2) only 
applies to vessels that have been arrested under laws and regulations relating to the 
exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of living resources in the 
EEZ. Yet, in the very first case to come before it, the Tribunal took a broad view of 
the interpretation of this provision. By a majority, it held that ‘laws or regulations on 
bunkering of fishing vessels may arguably be classified as laws or regulations on 
activities within the scope of the exercise by the coastal state of its sovereign rights to 
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic 
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zone.’61 Although the judgment in the M/V Saiga Case was adopted subject to the 
dissenting opinions of nine of judges62, the principle that the bunkering of fishing 
vessels in the EEZ falls within the sovereign rights of the coastal state was recently 
confirmed in the M/V Virginia G Case.63  It follows that both fishing vessels and 
vessels performing support functions to fishing operations will fall within the scope of 
this procedure. 
In interpreting and applying the substantive requirements of Article 73(2), the 
Tribunal has stressed the importance of balancing the interests of the coastal state and 
the flag state.  As held by ITLOS in the Monte Confurco Case: 64  
 
‘Article 73 identifies two interests, the interest of the coastal state to take 
appropriate measures as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws 
and regulations adopted by it on the one hand and the interest of the flag state 
in securing prompt release of its vessels and their crews from detention on the 
other. It strikes a fair balance between the two interests. It provides for release 
of the vessel and its crew upon the posting of a bond or other security, thus 
protecting the interests of the flag state and of other persons affected by the 
detention of the vessel and its crew.’ 
 
The principal obligation in Article 73(2) is to release the vessel upon payment 
of a bond.  Thus, the arresting state is under an obligation to set a bond.  The 
Convention does not specify the precise procedures that must be followed by the 
coastal state in setting a reasonable bond and the Tribunal has accepted that coastal 
states have some discretion to ‘determine the most appropriate procedure in 
accordance with its national law.’65   
Nor does the Convention set a precise time limit for the arresting state to do 
this. However, the Tribunal in interpreting and applying this provision has stated that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 M/V Saiga Case, ITLOS Judgment of 4 December 1997, para. 63.  
62 Dissenting opinions were delivered by President Mensah, Vice-President Wolfrum, and Judges 
Yamamoto, Park, Nelson, Chandrasekhara Rao, Vukas, Ndiaye, and Anderson. 
63 M/V Virginia G Case (n 13) para. 217. See, however, the accusation of judicial law-making by Judge 
Lucky in his Separate Opinion, para. 27. 
64 Monte Confurco Case, ITLOS Judgment of 18 December 2000, para. 70. 
65 M/V Virginia G Case (n 13) para. 284. See also para. 285: ‘The Tribunal observes that the practice of 
coastal states varies in this regard. In some coastal states the bond or other security is determined by 
the competent court on the basis of an application submitted by the owner or captain of a detained or 
arrested vessel. In other coastal states it is the executive branch that determines the bond or other 
security.” 
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‘the time required for setting a bond should be reasonable.’66 If the arresting state has 
not complied with this obligation, then the flag state may apply for the prompt release 
of the vessel and the bond will be set by ITLOS or other agreed forum.67 In practice, 
the allowance of a reasonable period of time to set a bond is likely to operate as a 
defence for the coastal state against premature applications for prompt release. Yet, it  
is unlikely that coastal states will be given too much leeway in this regard. Judge 
Tuerk noted in the Hoshinmaru Case that ‘[t]he exact time-period for the setting of a 
bond will certainly depend on the  degree of complexity of the investigations carried 
out by the detaining State and will thus have to vary from case to case’, but he went 
on to suggest that ‘a maximum period of approximately one month after the detention 
of a vessel and its crew would seem reasonable for the setting of the bond.’68 Indeed, 
one could argue that the text of the Convention supports the right of a flag state to 
initiate the prompt release procedure after 10 days and it is doubtful whether a court 
or tribunal should seek to construct a different reasonable period of time on the basis 
of abstract criteria.  From this perspective, the defence would not offer much 
sanctuary to the coastal state. 
It is not only in situations where no bond has been set that the Convention 
provides a right to challenge the actions of the coastal state. Although it is up to the 
coastal state in the first instance to determine the level of the bond, Article 292 
provides a procedure through which the reasonableness of a bond can be challenged 
by or on behalf of the flag state and the issue will be settled by ITLOS or another 
agreed forum.69 Determining a reasonable bond involves the balance of the interests 
of the coastal state and the flag state. There have been nine prompt release cases 
brought to the Tribunal to date and it has therefore had an opportunity to develop a 
jurisprudence on what factors should be taken into account by coastal states when 
setting a reasonable bond. Amongst the relevant considerations are ‘the gravity of the 
alleged offences, the penalties imposed or imposable under the laws of the detaining 
state, the value of the detained vessel and of the cargo seized, the amount of the bond 
imposed by the detaining state and its form’70, although this is not a closed list of 
factors and the Tribunal has expressly stated that it does not ‘intend to lay down rigid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Hoshinmaru Case, ITLOS Judgment of 6 August 2007, para. 80. 
67 M/V Saiga Case (n 61) para. 77. 
68 Hoshinmaru Case, Declaration of Judge Tuerk, para. 3. 
69 M/V Saiga Case (n 61) para. 77; Hoshinmaru Case (n 66) para. 65.  See also ITLOS Rules of 
Procedure, Art. 113(2). 
70 Camouco Case, ITLOS Judgment of 2 February 2000, para. 67. 
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rules as to the exact weight to be attached to each of them.’71   
It is clear that the process of setting a bond involves a case-by-case analysis. 
Following the basic principle of evidence, the burden of showing that the bond is 
unreasonable should fall upon the applicant. What is less clear is what standard of 
review is being applied by the Tribunal. In this regard, the Rules of the Tribunal 
provide that:72 
‘The Tribunal shall in its judgment determine in each case in accordance 
with article 292 of the Convention whether or not the allegation made by the 
applicant that the detaining state has not complied with a provision of the 
Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or the crew upon the posting 
of a reasonable bond or other financial security is well-founded.’ 
 
In the Juno Trader Case, the Tribunal added that ‘[t]he assessment of the 
relevant factors must be an objective one, taking into account all information provided 
to the Tribunal by the parties.’73  The Tribunal has also stressed that it is not acting as 
a court of appeal.74  Rather, it would appear that the Tribunal considers itself as 
carrying out an exercise of judicial review, similar to the process of reviewing the 
necessity of enforcement measures against foreign fishing vessels.  This suggests that 
there is a margin of appreciation for the coastal state in setting the level of the bond.  
Indeed, it can be argued that such a margin of appreciation is implicit in the notion of 
reasonableness itself.75  This is supported in the reasoning of Judge Anderson in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Monte Confurco Case (n 64) para. 76. 
72 ITLOS Rules of Procedure, Art. 113(1). 
73 Juno Trader Case, ITLOS Judgment of 18 December 2004, para. 85. 
74 Monte Confurco Case (n 64) para. 89. 
75 Camouco Case, Declaration of Judge Laing: ‘every day judicial bodies everywhere must objectively 
and impartially determine whether or not actions are reasonable, which is a neutral and unpejorative 
expression. According to Black’s, it carries the connotation of proportionality, balance, fairness, 
propriety, moderateness, suitability, tolerableness and or inexcessiveness. Among the synonyms which 
one can add is consistency. In the case of prompt release proceedings, the appropriate perspective is 
that of an international standard determined to be proper by the Tribunal. Generally, this will be on a 
plane and have a content that differs from those of domestic law. Certainly, in making determinations 
of reasonableness in prompt release cases, the Tribunal should never seek or appear to enforce the 
domestic laws of the detaining state or even substantive aspects of the Convention. I believe that the 
Judgment satisfies these tests. Equally and importantly, in determining reasonableness, the Tribunal 
must not and does not normally imply criticism of the domestic law or institutions of either litigant 
state. For one thing – prompt release proceedings are in no way akin to situations in which the 
international minimum standard is applied in substantive proceedings involving assertions of state 
delictual responsibility.’ 
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Camouco Case, where he opined that:76 
‘the local court should be accorded a wide discretion in fixing the amount of 
the security for release pending trial. In other words, national courts should be 
accorded a broad “margin of appreciation” …. In my view, it follows that an 
Applicant has to show very strong grounds for reducing the amount of the 
security fixed by a national court under local law in order to succeed under 
article 292.’ 
 
Yet, it is not always clear that the Tribunal has followed this approach.  The 
Tribunal would appear to be willing to overturn the bond set by the coastal state 
without explaining in detail why it is unreasonable and several judges have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the process, calling for greater clarity in this regard.77  Some 
judges have even gone as far as criticizing the Tribunal for rendering the right of the 
coastal state to take enforcement proceedings ‘an empty shell.’78 Unless the Tribunal 
exercises its power with caution, it is likely to upset the balance set out in the 
Convention and to undermine the sovereign rights of the coastal state.   
Not only has the Tribunal policed the amount of the bond that may be imposed 
by the coastal state, it has also determined what is meant by a bond in the context of 
Article 73(2). In the Volga Case, the Tribunal held that:79  
‘[T]he expression “bond or financial security” in article 73, paragraph 2, 
should, in the view of the Tribunal, be interpreted as referring to a bond or 
security of a financial nature. [...] It follows from the above that the non-
financial conditions cannot be considered components of a bond or other 
financial security for the purpose of applying article 292 of the Convention in 
respect of an alleged violation of article 73, paragraph 2 of the Convention.’  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Camouco Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anderson.  See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Wolfrum, paras 11-14. 
77 Camouco Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Laing: ‘It is important that the Tribunal should carefully 
develop its jurisprudence on the issue of reasonableness’; see also Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Wolfrum, para. 3:’ The Judgment does not give appropriate guidance on what basis it assesses a bond 
set by national authorities, on what are the possible reasons to declare a national bond to be 
unreasonable and on what are the criteria it uses to determine the amount of the bond set by the 
Tribunal.’ 
78 Camouco Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, para. 8. See also para. 15: ‘If the bond set by 
the Tribunal is lower than the fines against the Master and the owners the French authorities will find it 
more difficult, if not impossible, to collect them. This means, in essence, that setting a bond which is 
too low – which is the case here – means that the enforcement rights of coastal state concerning its 
laws on the management of marine living resources in the exclusive economic zone have been 
curtailed.’ 
79 Volga Case, ITLOS Judgment of 23 December 2002, para. 77. 
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On this basis, the Tribunal concluded that ‘a “good behaviour bond” to 
prevent future violations of the laws of a coastal state cannot be considered as a bond 
or security within the meaning of article 73, paragraph 2, of the Convention read in 
conjunction with article 292 of the Convention.’80 Thus, the requirement for the 
vessel to carry a vessel monitoring system pending the conclusion of the criminal 
proceedings was not permissible under the Convention. 81  This is an important 
decision for the balance between coastal state and flag state interests because it 
demonstrates the constraints that are imposed on the coastal state in this context.  
In the Volga Case, the Respondent also challenged the bail conditions 
imposed on the crew members. Initially, the crew members had been released from 
custody, but they had been required to surrender their passports and seaman's papers 
to the Australian authorities and to stay within the Perth metropolitan area. After 
appealing these bail conditions, the crew concerned were permitted to return to Spain, 
but they were required to surrender their passports and seaman's papers to the 
Australian embassy in Madrid, and they were also required to report monthly to 
consular officials. The Tribunal did not deal with this point in its decision.82 However, 
in light of its reasoning on the other aspects of the case, it is likely that any non-
financial conditions attached to the release of the crew would also be contrary to the 
requirements of Article 73 (2). 
 
4.2 Prompt Release in the Case of Environmental Offences 
The other situation in which the Convention expressly establishes an obligation of 
prompt release is in relation to environmental offences.  There are two relevant 
provisions in the Convention, one of which has a more general application than the 
other. 
Firstly, Article 220(7) provides that where the coastal state has agreed to 
specific procedures for the release of a vessel upon payment of a bond in another 
instrument, it shall comply with these provisions.  This provision does not establish an 
independent obligation of prompt release83, although it would allow the relevant states 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid., para. 80. 
81 However, see the dissenting opinions of Judge Anderson and Judge Ad Hoc Shearer. 
82 Volga Case (n 79) para. 74. 
83 See T. Treves, ‘The Proceedings Concerning Prompt Release of Vessels and Crews before the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’ (1996) 11 I.J.C.M.L. 179-200, 183. 
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to utilize the mechanism in Article 292 for the purposes of enforcing prompt release 
procedures contained in other agreements.  
In contrast, Article 226(1)(b) does establish an obligation in relation to 
environmental offences whereby ‘release shall be made promptly subject to 
reasonable procedures such as bonding or other appropriate financial security.’  This 
provision applies to proceedings for the enforcement of ‘applicable laws and 
regulations or international rules and standards for the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment’84 and it would therefore cover dumping and pollution 
offences.85 
The crux of the provision is the determination of whether a bonding 
requirement imposed by the coastal state on the detained vessel is ‘reasonable.’  This 
is a similar requirement to Article 73(2) and it would also demand the balancing of 
coastal state and flag state interests. To date, there have been no cases brought on the 
basis of Article 226(1)(b) and therefore it is not entirely clear how it will be 
interpreted in practice.  One key question that will arise is whether the bonding and 
financial security are just examples of ‘reasonable procedures’ and whether a coastal 
state could impose additional bonding requirements on vessels.  As noted above, this 
interpretation has been rejected in relation to Article 73(1) of the Convention. Yet, the 
language in Article 226(1)(b) is noticeably different and it is possible that it could 
have a wider meaning.86  
There are other important differences in the nature of the bonding process in 
relation to environmental offences.  In this situation, prompt release is not an absolute 
right and a coastal state may refuse to release a vessel ‘whenever it would present an 
unreasonable threat of damage to the marine environment.’87 Alternatively, a coastal 
state may make release conditional upon the ship proceeding to the nearest 
appropriate repair yard to have work carried out to make the vessel seaworthy.  This 
power of the coastal state supports a broader reading of the notion of ‘reasonable 
procedures’ in Article 226(1)(b).  
At the same time, it must be noted that the decision of a coastal state to refuse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 226(1)(b). 
85 Anderson (n 15) 175. 
86 As noted by the leading commentary on the Convention, it is possible that the language in Article 
226(1)(b) was chosen in order to ‘avoid any technical legal connotation which different legal systems 
might attach to the word “bond”’; M. Nordquist et al (eds), The United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982 – A Commentary, vol. 4 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991) 272. 
87 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 226(1)(c). 
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to release the vessel or to make it conditional are also subject to challenge using the 
Article 292 procedure and it will be up to the relevant court or tribunal to decide 
whether the decision is ‘reasonable.’ As with the case of fisheries offences, it is 
suggested that the coastal state should be given a margin of appreciation and the court 
or tribunal should only intervene if the decision of the coastal state was not supported 
by any evidence or arbitrary.  In making such an assessment, a court or tribunal may 
also have to take into account the precautionary approach which implies that a further 
degree of deference should be given to the coastal state when there is uncertainty 
about the risks posed to the environment.88 
 
4.3 Prompt Release for other EEZ Offences? 
The question arises whether there is a more general right to prompt release following 
an arrest in the EEZ. In the M/V Saiga Case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had 
suggested that ‘the applicability of article 292 to the arrest of a vessel in contravention 
of international law can also be argued, without reference to a specific provision of 
the Convention for the prompt release of vessels or their crews.’89 In making this 
argument, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines suggested that ‘it would be strange that 
the procedure for prompt release should be available in cases in which detention is 
permitted by the Convention (articles 73, 220 and 226) and not in cases in which it is 
not permitted by it.’90   Given the broad interpretation of Article 73 adopted by the 
Tribunal in the M/V Saiga Case, it was unnecessary for it to address this broader 
argument91 and therefore the issue remains open. 
In order to determine the validity of this argument, it is necessary to refer back 
to the text of Article 292. The key part of this provision would seem to be the 
reference to compliance with ‘the provisions of this Convention for the prompt 
release of a vessel or crew.’  In other words, invocation of the Article 292 procedure 
would appear to be dependent upon the existence of another provision for the prompt 
release of a vessel or crew.92 It follows that prompt release procedure has a limited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 See Rio Declaration, Principle 15: ‘where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.’ 
89 M/V Saiga (n 50) para. 53. 
90 Ibid, para. 53. 
91 Ibid, para. 73. 
92 However, see, to the contrary, Treves (n 83) 186: ‘… it would seem possible to resort to the prompt 
release procedure in other cases also. There are cases in which the Convention prohibits detention of 
ships and crews.  If a vessel of its crew has been detained in contravention of the Convention which 
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applicability and it would not be available for all situations in which the coastal state 
has exercised its enforcement powers in relation to the EEZ.93 In particular, the 
prompt release procedure would not be available for the exercise of enforcement 
powers in relation to jurisdiction over marine scientific research or jurisdiction over 
artificial islands, installations and structures. 
At the same time, the limited availability of the prompt release procedure 
under Article 292 does not mean that the release of a vessel cannot be requested 
through international dispute settlement procedures. In practice, states have sought to 
make requests for provisional measures in order to achieve this aim.94  In the M/V 
Louisa Case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines requested the Tribunal to ‘order the 
Respondent to release the vessel Louisa and its tender, the Gemini III, upon such 
terms and conditions as the Tribunal shall consider reasonable.’95  On the facts of the 
case, the Tribunal held that it was not appropriate to consent to the request.96 In 
contrast, in the Arctic Sunrise Case, the Tribunal did find it appropriate to order the 
release of a vessel as a provisional measure. Indeed, what is striking about the 
decision is the parallel that can be drawn to the prompt release procedure. The 
Netherlands had requested, inter alia, that the Russian Federation be ordered:97 
 
‘to immediately enable the ‘Arctic Sunrise’ to be resupplied, to leave its place 
of detention and the maritime areas under the jurisdiction of the Russian 
Federation and to exercise the freedom of navigation; 
  
to immediately release the crew members of the ‘Arctic Sunrise’, and allow 
them to leave the territory and maritime areas under the jurisdiction of the 
Russian Federation…’ 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
prohibits detention, it seems reasonable to hold that the most expeditious procedures available should 
be resorted to in order to ensure the release of the vessel or crew, independently of the question of 
international responsibility for the violation of the Convention.’  However, this argument ignores that 
Article 292 refers to provisions of the Convention ‘for the prompt release of the vessel or crew’, not 
provisions of the Convention relating to detention.  As noted below, the flag state could in these 
circumstances apply for the release of the vessel or crew as a provisional measure. 
93 Anderson (n 15) 169. 
94 See Oxman (n 4) 207; Anderson (n 15) 177, noting that ‘the exact relationship of Article 290 
(provisional measures) and Article 292 will have to be established by practice and precedent.’ 
95 M/V Louisa, ITLOS Order on Provisional Measures of 23 December 2010, para. 33. 
96 Ibid, para. 72. 
97 Arctic Sunrise, Order on Provisional Measures, para. 35. 
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Although the request did not make any mention of any conditions attached to 
the release of the vessel and the crew, the Tribunal exercised its power to prescribe 
provisional measures that are different from those that are requested98 and it held that 
‘under article 290 of the Convention, it may prescribe a bond or other financial 
security as a provisional measure for the release of the vessel and the persons 
detained.’99 The Tribunal went on to set a bond of 3,600,000 euros. 
Not all judges accepted that an order for prompt release was an appropriate 
use of the power to prescribe provisional measures, however.  Judge Jesus considered 
that the case represented a ‘back-door prompt release.’100 His particular concern was 
not related to the release of a vessel as a provisional measure per se, but rather to the 
conditioning of such a release on the posting of a reasonable bond.101  In addition, he 
observed that ‘a bond imposed as a condition for the release of vessel and crew in the 
framework of provisional measures, as in the present case, may not “preserve the 
rights” of the detaining state in cases in which the imposed or imposable penalties 
may involve imprisonment terms which, under the applicable domestic law, may not 
be convertible into a monetary penalty.’102 Similarly, Judge Golitsyn was also critical 
of the decision of the Tribunal, arguing that ‘by ordering the release of the Arctic 
Sunrise and all detained members of its crew, upon posting of a bond or other 
financial security, the Tribunal completely disregarded the rights of the Russian 
Federation.103  
These arguments do bear some weight but the decision of whether or not to 
release must ultimately come down to a weighing and balancing the rights of either 
side to the dispute.  Such a balancing process between the rights of the applicant and 
the respondent is inherent in the prescription of provisional measures, in the same 
way that it is in prompt release proceedings.  
Overall, there would appear to be good arguments to keep open the option for 
prompt release in the case of provisional measures proceedings. At the same time, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Arctic Sunrise, ITLOS Order on Provisional Measures of 22 November 2013, para. 94. 
99 Ibid, para. 93.  The Netherlands had itself offered a bond in its communication with the Russian 
Federation; ibid, para. 91. 
100 Arctic Sunrise, Separate Opinion of Judge Jesus, para. 7(b). 
101 Ibid, para. 7(c).  See also Arctic Sunrise, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Golitsyn, para. 49:’ ‘it is 
questionable whether the Tribunal can prescribe the release of the ship upon the posting of a reasonable 
bond under article 290, paragraph 5, of the Convention.’ 
102 Arctic Sunrise, Separate Opinion of Judge Jesus, para. 11. See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Kulyk, para. 14. 
103 Arctic Sunrise, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Golitsyn, para. 45. 
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must be recognized that there are fundamental differences between the two 
procedures.104  First and foremost, there is no right to prompt release as a provisional 
measures. Rather the decision to order a release or not will also depend upon the 
outcome of the weighing and balancing process. Similarly, a weighing and balancing 
process will determine the amount of a bond associated with the release of the vessel.  
Moreover, it should also be noted that release as a provisional measure does not 
necessarily depend upon the posting of a bond and it is perfectly possible to order the 
release of a vessel as a provisional measure without any financial security at all.105  
Again, this will depend upon the rights being exercised by the coastal state and the 
facts of a particular case.  Thus, the decision of whether or not to order the release of 
a vessel as a provisional measure is another example of international courts and 
tribunals playing a central role in upholding the balance of interests between coastal 
state rights and the interests of other states. 
 
5. Limits on Penalties to be imposed by Coastal state for EEZ 
Offences 
Generally speaking, it is up to the authorities of a state to determine what is an 
appropriate punishment for a particular offence.  As a matter of principle, states 
should be considered to have a broad discretion in this regard, subject to any express 
conditions imposed by international law. The Law of the Sea Convention only 
contains provisions on this subject matter in relation to fisheries offences and 
environmental offences.  
 
5.1 Penalties for Fisheries Offences 
Article 73 also deals with the powers of a coastal state to impose punishments for 
violations of fisheries laws and regulations if an offender is found guilty at trial. 
Firstly, it completely prohibits corporal punishment for fisheries offences. 106 
Secondly, it restricts the use of imprisonment as a form of punishment without the 
agreement of the concerned state.107  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See Arctic Sunrise, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kulyk, para. 12. 
105 For example, the ARA Libertad Case, Order on Provisional Measures of 15 December 2012. 
106 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 73 (3). 
107 Anderson has argued that ‘paragraph 3 does not rule out imprisonment for willful refusal to pay a 
penalty imposed by a competent court’; Anderson (n 15) 170.  In the M/V Virginia G Case, the 
Tribunal rejected the arguments put forward by Panama that confinement to the ship and the temporary 
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Within the limits set by Article 73, coastal states clearly have some discretion 
as to the types of penalties that they may impose on fishing vessels which are found to 
have violated their laws and regulations. By way of example, ITLOS has confirmed 
that such penalties may include the confiscation of a fishing vessel even though it is 
not explicitly mentioned by Article 73.108 At the same time, it was also noted that 
‘confiscation of a fishing vessel must not be used in such a manner as to upset the 
balance of the interests of the flag state and of the coastal state established in the 
Convention.’109 In the words of the Tribunal, ‘such a decision [to confiscate] should 
not be taken in such a way as to prevent the shipowner from having recourse to 
available domestic judicial remedies, or as to prevent the flag state from resorting to 
the prompt release procedure set forth in the Convention; nor should it be taken 
through proceedings inconsistent with international standards of due process of 
law.’110  The reference to international standards of due process of law is significant 
as it introduces another general safeguard on the exercise of coastal state powers.  
Presumably, the reference would include international human rights provisions 
relating to the right to a fair trial.  In other words, ITLOS has conferred on itself the 
power to step inside the courtroom and to determine whether national courts are 
complying with international human rights standards when trying fisheries cases. 
In this context, the Tribunal has also decided that penalties for fisheries offences must 
pass the necessity test included in Article 73(1).111 As noted above, the concept of 
‘necessary’ is ambiguous and it should be applied with care to enforcement measures. 
This is particularly the case in relation to the imposition of penalties. In the Virginia 
G Case, the Tribunal applied the necessity test at two levels.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
holding of passports amounted to imprisonment, in violation of the Convention; M/V Virginia G Case 
(n 13) paras 308, 310. See however, the Separate Opinion of Judge Lucky, para. 50 who says ‘the word 
“imprisonment” in article 73, paragraph 3, must be given a wide and generous meaning. The meaning 
ascribed ought not to be that the individual must be sent to a prison and confined in cell. The term 
imprisonment means the restraint of a person contrary to his will; in other words it means a deprivation 
of one’s liberty. As to what will amount to imprisonment, the most obvious modes are confinement in a 
prison or private house (in this case a ship). In my view the crew were deprived of their right to liberty 
and freedom.’ He does not explain, however, why the term imprisonment must be given a ‘wide and 
generous meaning’ and not its ‘ordinary meaning’ in light of the context and object and purpose, as 
required by Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
108 Tomimaru Case, ITLOS Judgment of 6 August 2007, para. 72.  See also M/V Virginia G Case (n 
13) para. 255. 
109 Tomimaru Case (n 108) para. 75. 
110 Ibid, para. 76. 
111 See M/V Virginia G Case (n 13) para. 257. See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Servulo 
Correia, para. 23: ‘The concept of “judicial proceedings” is indeterminate. The practice of states shows 
that the expression “as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations ...” 
includes sanctions and that confiscation is one of them.’   
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Firstly it applied the test to a penalty in the abstract.  Thus, the Tribunal had to 
decide whether the confiscation of a vessel offering bunkering services to foreign 
vessels fishing in the EEZ was necessary.112 The Tribunal relied upon ‘the practice of 
coastal states on the sanctioning of violations of fishing laws and regulations’113 in 
order to determine that it was a necessary measure.   
Secondly, and more decisively, the necessity test was also applied to the 
concrete application of a penalty in a particular case.114  It is in this context that the 
Tribunal found, by a majority, that the confiscation of the M/V Virginia and the gas 
oil on board were not necessary, despite the fact that it accepted that the offence 
committed by the vessel was a ‘serious violation.’115  A number of ‘mitigating 
factors’116 were considered by the Tribunal in reaching this decision. In particular, it 
took into account the fact that Guinea Bissau had been informed of the bunkering 
activities, even though the proper procedures for authorization had not been 
followed.117  It also took into account that the other vessels involved in the bunkering 
operations were not confiscated and it concluded that ‘the confiscation of the vessel 
and the gas oil on board in the circumstances of the present case was not necessary 
either to sanction the violation committed or to deter the vessels and their operators 
from repeating this violation.’118 In practice, the approach of the Tribunal appears to 
be closer to a proportionality test, given that the aims of the measure are weighed 
against the means through which they are carried out.119  The approach of the 
Tribunal can be seen as problematic in two ways.   
Firstly, it must be wondered whether the necessity test should be applied to 
penalties at all.  As noted by Judge Kulyk in his declaration, enforcement measures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 M/V Virginia G Case (n 13) para.  257. The Tribunal noted that were confiscation the automatic 
remedy for all violations of its fisheries laws, it may have questioned the necessity of the measure. 
However, it recognized that the authorities had flexibility in deciding whether to confiscate the oil on 
board the vessel. 
113 Ibid, para. 253. 
114 Ibid, para.  257. 
115 Ibid, para.  267. 
116 Ibid, para.  268. 
117 Ibid, para. 269.  See however the dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Servulo Correia, para. 15; 
Declaration of Judge Gao, para. 30. 
118 M/V Virginia G Case (n 13) para. 269. 
119 For a discussion of the pros and cons of proportionality in international litigation, see e.g., M. 
Andenas and S. Zleptnig, ‘Proportionality: WTO Law in Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 42 Texas 
Int’l L. J. 371; C. Henckels, ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting 
Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration’ (2012) 15 J.I.E.L 
223-255. More generally, see B. Pirker, Proportionality Analysis and Models of Judicial Review 
(Europa Law Publishing, 2013). 
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should be distinguished from sanctions for offences.120   
Secondly, the way in which the necessity was applied would seem to be too 
prescriptive, leaving little discretion to the coastal state.  In their joint dissenting 
opinion, Vice President Hoffman and Judges Rao, Marotta Rangel, Kateka, Gao, and 
Bouguetaia stressed the importance of granting a margin of appreciation to the coastal 
state in making enforcement decisions in relation to fisheries offences and they 
criticized the Tribunal for having functioned more akin to an appellate authority.121 
The dissenting judges suggested that the Tribunal should only exercise the power of 
review if ‘there is manifest error in the exercise of power or the exercise of power is 
manifestly arbitrary or if the power is exercised on the basis of facts which no not 
exist and which are patently erroneous.’122 Further more, in applying a reasonableness 
test to the facts of the case, they did not believe that the measures taken by Guinea 
Bissau were unreasonable.123 Judge ad hoc Servulo Correia came to a similar 
conclusion, finding that ‘[u]nder paragraph 1 of article 73, judicial deference is only 
excluded when it is manifest or absolutely clear that a less intrusive or onerous 
measure would have been equally suitable and effective in attaining the legal aim. But 
only in extreme cases is it possible to reach such a conclusion where the policy 
choices are of a discretionary nature.’124  
Rather confusingly, alongside the necessity test, the Tribunal also applies a 
test of reasonableness to the sanctions imposed by Guinea Bissau in the M/V Virginia 
G Case. The Tribunal explained, ‘the principle of reasonableness applies generally to 
enforcement measures under article 73 of the Convention.’125  It does not explain the 
origins of this principle. Furthermore, it is equally not clear what content is given to 
the reasonableness standard employed by the Tribunal in this context. It would not 
seem to differ to any extent from the necessity analysis already carried out. Thus, 
even when applying a reasonableness test, the Tribunal also fails to give any margin 
of appreciation to the coastal state.  In doing so, the Tribunal arguably tips the balance 
in favour of the interests of the flag state and it undermines the sovereign nature of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 M/V Virginia G Case, Declaration of Judge Kulyk, para. 9. A similar conclusion was reached by 
Judge Jesus, albeit on slight different grounds; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jesus, paras 17-20. 
121 M/V Virginia G Case, Dissenting Opinion of Vice President Hoffman and Judges Rao, Marotta 
Rangel, Kateka, Gao, and Bouguetaia, para. 55. 
122 Ibid, para. 54. 
123 Ibid, paras 56-57. 
124 M/V Virginia G Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Servulo Correia, para. 21. 
125 M/V Virginia G Case (n 13) para. 270. 
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rights possessed by the coastal state in relation to fisheries in the EEZ. 
 
5.2 Penalties for Environmental Offences in the EEZ 
The scope for the coastal state to impose penalties in relation to environmental 
offences is even more limited than in relation to fisheries.  The Convention provides 
that in this situation, ‘monetary penalties only may be imposed.’126  Thus, the 
Convention prescribes a single penalty that may be applied to environmental offences.   
At the same time, it would not appear that the Convention limits the discretion 
of states in setting appropriate monetary penalties.  It has been noted in a slightly 
different context that ‘the Convention does not put a limit on the amount of fines 
against violators a coastal state may consider appropriate.’ 127   Indeed, related 
international treaties encourage states to set penalties that are ‘adequate in severity to 
discourage violations’ in the future.128  Even if one were to imply a general test of 
reasonableness in relation to penalties for environmental offences, there should be a 
wide margin of appreciation given to the coastal state in this matter. 
The Convention also requires that proceedings in which a penalty may be 
imposed must be respect ‘the recognized rights of the accused.’129  The Convention 
does not specify what these rights are, although it can be argued that a court or 
tribunal would interpret this provision in light of the international human right to a 
fair trial.130  
 
6. International Review of Coastal State Enforcement Powers 
It has been seen in the preceding analysis that the Convention seeks to establish a 
delicate balance between the power of coastal states to protect its sovereign rights 
interests in the EEZ and the freedom of navigation of foreign ships in that zone. Many 
of these safeguards use concepts such as necessity or reasonableness in order to 
determine when it is legitimate for a coastal state to exercise enforcement powers in 
the EEZ. It has been argued throughout this paper that the concept of sovereign rights 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 230(1). 
127 Camouco Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, para. 6. See also Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Anderson. 
128 MARPOL Convention, Art. 4(4). 
129 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 230(3). 
130 According to the leading commentary on the text, ‘guidance may be found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1966, as well as in other global and regional instruments dealing with human rights, regarding the 
concept of “fair trial” and the rights of an accused person’; Nordquist (n 86) 370. 
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implies that the coastal state should have a degree of deference in deciding whether to 
take enforcement action.  Nevertheless, the discretion of a coastal state cannot be 
unlimited and the safeguards in the Convention provide an important check against 
the excessive exercise of enforcement powers in a way that would undermine the 
rights and interests of other state.  However, the effectiveness of these safeguards also 
depends upon the availability of an international court or tribunal to intervene when it 
was alleged that a coastal state had exceeded its powers. 
The Law of the Sea Convention is well-known for its dispute settlement 
procedure. Generally speaking, any party can bring a claim against another party to 
the Convention if a dispute exists between them, provided that they satisfy certain 
procedural prerequisites.131  Where such a procedure exists, the safeguards provide an 
effective mechanism to uphold the balance of rights inherent in the Convention 
regime.132  
Nevertheless, not all states were willing to submit all issues to international 
adjudication and a number of mandatory and optional exceptions are included in 
Articles 297 and 298 of the Convention respectively.  The optional exceptions from 
the compulsory dispute settlement proceedings include ‘disputes concerning law 
enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights excluded from the 
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3.’133 Although this 
exclusion must be explicitly claimed by a party to the Convention to be valid, many 
states have done so in practice.134 Therefore, it serves to shelter enforcement actions 
covered by the exclusion from international scrutiny and it undermines the 
effectiveness of the safeguards.   
The cross-reference in this provision to Article 297(2) and (3) covers disputes 
concerning the law enforcement activities in relation to marine scientific research and 
fisheries.  It follows that it would not be possible to initiate proceedings relating to the 
enforcement powers of coastal states in relation to fishing and marine scientific 
research if it had invoked these exceptions to compulsory dispute settlement under the 
Convention. In contrast, disputes concerning enforcement activities in relation to 
environmental offences or offences committed in the safety zone of an artificial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 287. 
132 Franckx (n 5) 324. 
133 Law of the Sea Convention, Art. 298(1)(b). 
134 For a list of states which have taken up the optional exclusion under Art. 298 (1)(b) UNCLOS, see 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm#Choice%20of%20procedur
e (last visited on 13 May 2014). 
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island, installation or structure would not fall within the scope of this exclusion.135 It 
follows that there is more likelihood that these safeguards will be enforceable in 
practice and they will prove a more effective limit on the powers of the coastal state 
in the EEZ.   
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated the range of safeguards that apply to coastal states when 
exercising their enforcement powers in the EEZ. Some of these safeguards are 
procedural in nature, such as the duty to inform the flag state when a vessel is 
arrested. However, some of the safeguards go to the core of what action a coastal state 
may take to enforce its national laws and regulations in the EEZ. This is particularly 
the case with the limitations on what enforcement measures may be taken and what 
penalties may be imposed. 
The safeguards are important because they prevent the coastal state from using 
their EEZ powers to infringe upon legitimate freedom of navigation. At the same 
time, it is necessary to ensure that the safeguards are not interpreted too strictly, 
otherwise the powers of the coastal state in the EEZ will be undermined.  Thus, many 
of the safeguards involve some sort of balancing exercise, which takes into account 
both interests of the coastal state and the flag state.   
It is clear that international courts and tribunals have played a key role in 
carrying out this balancing process when interpreting and applying the various 
safeguard provisions in the Convention. Yet, the jurisprudence demonstrates that 
there is still some disagreement on precisely how this balance should be struck. In 
particular, there is no consensus on how much discretion should be given to coastal 
states in deciding what enforcement measures should be taken against foreign vessels 
in their EEZ.  This is clearly an issue where the decisions of the Tribunal have been 
lacking in clarity and there is scope for the jurisprudence to develop further.  The 
present author takes the view that the Tribunal has sometimes gone too far in its 
scrutiny of coastal state enforcement and it should give a broader margin of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See e.g. Arctic Sunrise (n 98) para. 45: ‘in the view of the Tribunal, the declaration made by the 
Russian Federation with respect to law enforcement activities under article 298, paragraph 1(b), of the 
Convention prima facie applies only to disputes excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal 
under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3, of the Convention.’ Thus, the Tribunal implied that this exclusion 
could not be invoked in a case involving jurisdiction over an artificial installation in the EEZ. 
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appreciation in deciding whether EEZ enforcement action is reasonable, appropriate 
or necessary for the purposes of the Convention.  This view not only better reflects 
the nature of the rights and jurisdiction possessed by the coastal state in this zone, but 
it also prevents international courts and tribunals from stepping beyond their judicial 
character and substituting their own decisions for those of the coastal state authorities.  
 
